The Giovanni Toti Plea Deal: Nature of Electoral Contributions and Accessory Penalties

1. The fact

   The case, which has reached an advanced stage of procedural definition, originates from the corruption investigation involving the leadership of the Liguria Region and several economic operators. According to reports by outlets such as Il Sole 24 Ore and Corriere della Sera, former president Giovanni Toti has agreed with the Genoa Prosecutor's Office on a plea bargain. At the heart of the agreement is no longer the initial charge of proper corruption for acts contrary to official duties, but rather the reclassification under the hypothesis of corruption for the exercise of function (Art. 318 c.p.). The most significant technical aspect in this phase concerns the fate of the sums paid to the Toti Committee: the Prosecution maintained, and the defense accepted within the framework of the plea deal, that over 84,000 euros constitute the profit of the crime. These sums, despite being tracked and reported according to the rules on party financing, were considered the consideration for a generic availability of the public official towards private interests. The proceeding is now pending the GIP's evaluation of the plea deal proposal, which also includes temporary accessory penalties of interdiction from public offices and the inability to contract with the Public Administration. Other aspects of the case, such as community service, are covered in dedicated articles in this column.

2. 

   The laws at play

   1. Article 318 c.p. punishes the public official who unduly receives money or other utility for the exercise of their functions, constituting a crime of danger that does not require the identification of a specific unlawful administrative act.
   2. Article 322-ter c.p. governs the mandatory confiscation of the profit of the crime of corruption, requiring the State to acquire assets that represent the economic advantage derived from the illicit agreement.
   3. Article 444 c.p.p. regulates plea bargaining, allowing the defendant to agree on the sentence benefiting from a discount of up to one third, but binding the judge to a congruity check on the legal qualification.
   4. Law 3/2019, known as Spazzacorrotti, tightened the regime of accessory penalties, making interdiction from public offices an almost automatic consequence and difficult to reduce even in special rites for crimes against the Public Administration.

3. What case law says

   The case law of the Supreme Court has clarified that corruption for the exercise of function occurs with the simple subservience of the public official to private interests, transforming the public function into an object of exchange. Regarding confiscation, the consolidated orientation of the Court of Cassation establishes that electoral contributions, even if formally paid in compliance with the law on party financing, take on the nature of profit of the crime when an illicit nexus of instrumentality exists between the payment and the office. On accessory penalties in plea bargaining, judges have reiterated that, following the most recent reforms, the judge cannot exclude the application of disqualifying sanctions for corruption crimes if the agreed penalty exceeds two years of imprisonment. Case law also emphasizes that the nature of accessory penalties meets a need for special prevention, aimed at removing the subject from the management of public affairs, regardless of the negotiated nature of the plea bargaining sentence.

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8. What it teaches professionals

   1. It is essential to advise political clients on a clear separation between institutional activity and fundraising, as the case law on Art. 318 c.p. is extremely punitive towards generic availability.
   2. During plea bargaining, the calculation of profit for confiscation purposes must be the subject of analytical negotiation to avoid disproportionate asset forfeitures based on extensive interpretations.
   3. Maximum attention must be paid to the accessory penalties of the Spazzacorrotti Law, as exceeding the two-year threshold of the main sentence makes interdiction almost inevitable.
   4. The defense strategy must evaluate whether the reclassification of the crime justifies the acceptance of a massive confiscation in exchange for a reduction in the prison sentence.

References: Articolo 318 Codice PenaleArticolo 322-ter Codice PenaleArticolo 444 Codice di Procedura PenaleLegge 3/2019 (Legge Spazzacorrotti)

Editorial oversight: Avv. Federico Papa·ICAMUpdated 18 September 2026Content drafted with AI support and subject to editorial source checks. Despite these controls, inaccuracies may remain: reports and rectification requests are welcome. Report a correction