AGCM Investigation into Google: Abuse of Dominant Position in the DMA Era

1. The fact

   According to reports from Milano Finanza and Il Sole 24 Ore, the case originated from a complaint lodged by an innovative startup, which claimed it was technically impossible to access user data, even with user consent, due to limitations imposed by Google. The antitrust investigation, launched in 2022, aimed to determine whether Google had abused its dominant position in the online search and operating systems markets to hinder the development of alternative platforms. The proceeding is now in the final stage of compliance monitoring, after the Authority accepted a series of technological commitments aimed at facilitating the use of application programming interfaces (APIs) for data transfer. Investigations demonstrated that Google controlled access to information flows essential for competing startups. According to the initial allegations, this conduct generated a so-called lock-in effect, making it excessively burdensome for users to migrate their personal data to third-party services. The procedural path evolved from preliminary assessment to the adoption of binding commitments, the breach of which would expose the company to substantial fines calculated on its global turnover.

2. 

   The legal framework

   1. Article 102 TFEU: the core provision prohibiting the abusive exploitation of a dominant position within the European internal market, penalizing conduct that hinders the maintenance or development of competition.
   2. Article 3 of Law No. 287/1990: the national counterpart of the prohibition of abuse of dominance, applied by the AGCM to sanction undertakings imposing unjustifiably onerous contractual conditions.
   3. Digital Markets Act (DMA): EU regulation directly applicable to gatekeepers, imposing specific interoperability obligations and prohibiting self-preferencing practices.
   4. Article 20 of the GDPR: guarantees the right to data portability, applied here not only as a privacy safeguard, but also as a benchmark for assessing an operator's competitive fairness.

3. What case law says

   The courts of last resort and the European courts have clarified that holding a dominant position is not unlawful per se, but entails a special responsibility not to impair effective and undistorted competition. In particular, the European courts have affirmed that an antitrust authority may legitimately interpret and apply data protection regulations (such as the GDPR) when necessary to establish an exclusionary abuse. Established case law indicates that so-called self-preferencing, namely the practice of favoring one's own ancillary services through control of the primary infrastructure, constitutes an infringement when it causes harm to consumers in terms of choice and innovation. Furthermore, the courts have specified that proof of harm does not strictly require the exit of competitors from the market, it being sufficient to demonstrate that the conduct is capable of appreciably restricting competition.

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8. What it teaches professionals

   1. Interoperability as a competitive tool: legal counsel must treat data portability not merely as a privacy compliance item, but as a competitive leverage actionable before antitrust authorities.
   2. Lock-in analysis: it is essential to technically document the impossibility of migration in order to establish exclusionary abuse.
   3. Gatekeeper oversight: with the application of the DMA, the burden of proof on large platforms is heightened, facilitating remedies for aggrieved SMEs.
   4. Commitment strategy: practitioners should carefully weigh the advantages of negotiating swift technical remedies against the risks of prolonged penalty proceedings.

References: Articolo 102 TFUEArticolo 3 Legge 287/1990Articolo 20 GDPRDigital Markets Act (DMA)

Editorial oversight: Avv. Federico Papa·ICAMUpdated 7 September 2026Content drafted with AI support and subject to editorial source checks. Despite these controls, inaccuracies may remain: reports and rectification requests are welcome. Report a correction